I use GMM to estimate parameters for a Ben-Porath human capital model to analyze the decision to steal in data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997 for data from 1997 to 2011. Importantly, wages are as high or higher for thieves during the ages of peak activity, but drop considerably after the period of active theft, making it difficult to point to theft as a substitute for labor. I estimate that thieves have $0.60-0.67/hour less in initial human capital, and discount rates that are 0.3-0.4% lower. In combination these provide a rational basis for the decision to steal.
The rational agent model can explain variation in criminal activity across individuals with two different types of heterogeneity. One potential explanation is that criminals face objectively different costs and benefits from crime than non-criminals. For example, criminals may systematically lack access to employment opportunities, and turn to crime as a partial or total substitute for legitimate earnings. The other general explanation may be that criminals have systematically different preference structures than non-criminals. In particular, it may be the case that criminals are more present-oriented and less patient than non-criminals.
In this paper I develop a model that integrates human capital development and criminal behavior choices (specifically theft). Focusing on three parameters that could vary human capital production and earnings -initial human capital, human capital growth, and time preference -I analyze how variation might influence an individual's incentives to commit theft. Using parameterizations consistent with previous literature and the NLSY data, I use the model to understand how these parameters affect hourly earnings (a measure of instantaneous opportunity cost) as well as discounted present value of future earnings.
The first result of this analysis of the model is that differences in human capital growth, what we might think of as "potential", fail to create any difference in incentives for individuals in their early adulthood, the period of peak property crime offenses. Individuals with lower capacity for human capital development, even though they will have significantly lower future income, are not predicted to face lower present value of future income and in fact are predicted to have higher hourly earnings in early life.
Moving beyond this theoretical analysis, I then estimate the parameters of the model using generalized method of moments (GMM), using wages and annual income of male respondents in the NLSY 1997 cohort from 1997 to 2011. Across a range of specifications, estimated initial human capital for thieves is roughly $0.60-0.67/hour less than non-thieves (honest individuals). For annual income, the estimated difference is $2,200-2,450/year. Similarly, the estimated discount rates for thieves are about 0.3-0.4% lower than those of non-thieves.
A third result (also discussed in another paper, under review at Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization) comes from analyzing the data of the first several rounds of the NLSY, during the period of peak property crime activity: wages, income and employment levels are the same if not higher for thieves than for non-thieves (honest individuals). This clearly is significant evidence against explanations for theft that assume lower instantaneous opportunity cost, or arguing that theft is a substitute for legitimate labor market opportunities. The difference in earnings and employment shows up in the mid to late twenties, after virtually all self-reported thieves have stopped committing property crime.
The combination of low initial human capital and high impatience suggested by wage development is also consistent with other measures in the data. Thieves have lower standardized test scores and worse mental health than non-thieves (honest individuals). They show less stability over jobs (on average having more employers) and are more likely to repeat grades, even when controlling for a range of measures of socioeconomic status and ability.
Beyond the literature on theft and crime, the analysis here has a broader utility, in suggesting that individuals with significantly limited human capital may have equal or better labor market outcomes in their early careers. While thieves show no difference in wages and hours work at age 20, a range of parameterizations suggest that by age 40 there could be a gap of 20% or more in income. Analysis of labor market outcomes that focuses on individuals in their 20s (for example, Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) ) may be missing significant longterm differences.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I review the literature on earnings from crime and the honest earnings of criminals, as well as the literature on human capital. In section 3 I develop and solve a model that links the decision to steal with the decision to invest in human capital. I then look at what the model predicts across a range of parameterizations. In section 4 I review the data from the NLSY. In section 5 I estimate the model's parameters using GMM based on data from the NLSY. In section 6 I summarize the results and discuss implications.
Appendices A through C outline various technical issues.
I. LITERATURE I.1 Incentivesf orCrime
Richard Freeman is perhaps the researcher of the past few decades who has done the most to develop the theory of crime as a substitute for legal work, and what that means in our understanding of both crime and work (Freeman (1999 ), Freeman (1991 ). Papers to show a link using individual-level data on actual wages include Grogger (1998) and Lochner (2004) . A number of papers find interesting patterns at an aggregate level, including Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) . Helpful literature reviews include Piehl (1998) and Lin (2008) .
Criminologists have been more skeptical of the idea, and a number of researchers in that field find little or no evidence that crime is a rational choice. As Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) argue, while a single crime can be a rational choice, given a low probability of capture ("The wonder is that more people don't steal") a criminal career seems not to pay off at all. One of the dominant theories of crime, outlined in Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) , can be summarized as arguing that criminals simply have less self-control. Even a number of economists have found evidence that disagrees. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) examine the revenues and wages provided by drug-dealing in a gang in Chicago and conclude "it is difficult (but not impossible) to reconcile the behavior of the gang members with an optimizing economic model without assuming nonstandard preferences or bringing in social/nonpecuniary benefits of gang participation." Lee and McCrary (2005) look at the deterrent power of prison sentences and conclude "criminal behavior -at least for the kinds of crimes that we focus on -could be thought of as the consequence of a self-control problem and a taste for immediate gratification."
Many researchers have found that criminals actually have slightly higher wages than noncriminals, especially in early periods. Specifically, Nagin and Waldfogel (1995) find that conviction leads to greater instability but also higher pay. They quote West and Farrington (1977) who noted a "tendency for delinquents and especially recidivists to take up laboring or unskilled occupations offering relatively high rates of pay for beginners, but with relatively few prospects of long-term advancement. Non-delinquents were more likely to defer immediate material rewards for the sake of obtaining apprenticeships or training for skilled work. " Paternoster, Bushway, Apel, and Brame (2003) provides an excellent review of the literature on the link between early work and antisocial behavior. They establish a strong correlation between intensive work in adolescence and theft (and other behaviors), but show that unobserved heterogeneity appears to be the cause (see also Brame, Bushway, Paternoster, and Apel (2004) , Apel, Bushway, Paternoster, Brame, and Sweeten (2008) , Holzman (1982, table 4) ).
There is no consensus on how much a criminal record damages wages. Freeman (1991) finds that incarceration reduces weeks worked from somewhere between 8 to 20 weeks per year, and reduces the probability of work by 15 to 30 percent. Grogger (1995) and Nagin and Waldfogel (1995) (cited above) are much more cautious; both find limited effects on wages and employment (in some cases positive).
An important stylized fact is that criminal activity is particularly intense during adolescence.
In another paper (under review at Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization) I discuss the evidence for this across the literature, and introduce new evidence from the NLSY 1997 that in fact individuals that commit property crime very rarely engage in it for longer than one year.
This adolescent aspect of crime, and particularly property crime, is not well-explained as yet (see Levitt and Lochner (2001) , Levitt (1997) , Lee and McCrary (2005) , Grogger (1998) ).
I.2 HumanCapitalT heory
In the literature of human capital, while Friedman and Kuznets (1954) may be the original development of the logic of human capital, Becker (1962) seems to have been the critical article to put all the pieces in place. Additional work was done by Mincer (1974) and Ben-Porath (1967) . James Heckman and his students have done extensive work in this area in the past few decades (see Cunha and Heckman (2007) , Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006),Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) ).
A number of researchers have developed models looking at different types of human capital and the interaction of education, work and criminal behavior, for example Merlo and Wolpin (2009) . The paper that most resembles this one is Lochner (2004) , in that both use a human capital model based on the Ben-Porath model and then test this model against NLSY data.
The key differences stem from a difference in approach: this paper uses a simpler model. The simplification of the model is a trade-off; as a negative, it ignores a number of real-world issues, but as a plus, allows for a more comprehensive analysis of optimal behavior. Specifically, my model of human capital development satisfies both Kuhn-Tucker necessity and Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency allowing me to identify a single optimum. I believe this is a justifiable trade-off.
Additionally, I use the NLSY 1997 which provides more detailed data as opposed to the NLSY 1979 that Lochner uses. The data on returns from theft lead to a different approach to modeling crime -I model a theft as a "negative lottery" with a strong stochastic element. In the end our conclusions are similar: I argue that both initial human capital and individual discount rate are crucial to understanding both theft and human capital development, while Lochner focuses largely on differences in initial human capital levels.
II. MODEL
The model focuses on understanding the decision to steal in the context of overall career choices and lifetime income. Thus, one component of the model is a human capital investment problem.
The other component of the model is a fixed sequence of decisions to steal or not to steal. The decision to steal is modeled in a way that might be described as selling a call option, or (more intuitively for readers who are not derivative traders) as a "negative lottery," where theft is largely about the trade-off between immediate returns and long-term risks.
Partly because it fits the data well, and partly for reasons of mathematical simplicity, the human capital investment decision and the decision to steal are not incorporated in a single equation, but instead are kept separate and affect each other indirectly. Each agent lives for T periods. At the beginning of each period agents set their human capital investment levels, based on their parameters (human capital level, discount rate, human capital production parameters).
At the very beginning (period 0), they also have the opportunity to steal after setting their human capital investment level; they are exposed to a sequence of criminal opportunities where for each they can make the binary choice to take the opportunity or to pass on it. If they choose to steal, there is a risk of punishment. The punishment inflicts direct disutility as well as a negative shock to human capital levels, requiring revized production choices. If an agent's human capital is "tarnished", then in the next period (period 1) he will need to reoptimize his human capital investment levels accordingly.
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II.1 HumanCapitalComponent
There is a population of N agents, indexed i ∈ {1, . . . , N } who are maximizing utility over T periods. In each period t each agent chooses what percentage of their human capital to hold back from the market as "investment", which I denote with the variable x it ∈ [0, 1]. The value of x it ranges from 1 for a full time student with no job to 0 for a full-time worker at a job receiving no training, and would be somewhere in the range (0, 1) if i is receiving some wage compensation but is also receiving some training, formal or informal. The problem in period 0 is thus formally:
That is, the agent i needs to find an optimal sequence of investment decisions {x it } T 0 given the parameter values and his initial level of human capitalK i .
Two brief points should be made about the model at this juncture.
First, this is a simplified variant of the Ben-Porath human capital model, which in turn is a variant of the standard dynamic optimization capital accumulation model, with an added wrinkle that the capital is not consumed. Second, the model does not include a depreciation parameter; this decision is made for simplicity, and because for the population we will be focusing on, youths age 17 to 31, all evidence suggests that human capital growth swamps human capital decay and it is difficult to separate any decline in human capital from a general failure to invest in human capital.
At the beginning of every periodt, agent i can reassess his level of human capital K it and reset his planned sequence of investment {x it } T t .
1 The decision to allow theft in only a single period fits the NLSY data very closely, as well as the literature on patterns of theft (see the literature review) and also simplifies the mathematical analysis. Extending the option of theft behavior to multiple periods is a possible extension of this work.
II.2 CriminalOpportunitiesComponent
The second component of the model involves criminal activity. There is a single point in time when individuals have the opportunity to steal; in between the investment decisions of period 0 and period 1 the agent is sequentially offered S opportunities to steal. For the remainder of the agent's life, periods 1 through T , there will be no further theft opportunities.
Each opportunity can be thought of as roughly equivalent to selling a call option, or more simply, as a "negative" lottery: a standard lottery asks you to pay out a sum of money in exchange for the possibility of winning a positive sum in the future. In contrast, these theft opportunities offer the agent a positive sum of money in exchange for the possibility of a future loss. The cash value of the opportunity is denoted r is and has a random distribution f (r is ; θ) where f () has support (0, ∞) and is decreasing in r is . To simplify matters, I assume that when each opportunity is presented the agent can perfectly perceive r is and has no risk of being stopped or captured while committing the theft, only after consuming the value r is . His decision to steal or not is a very simple cost/benefit analysis of the two paths.
For the first opportunity, s = 1, if he does not take opportunity r is , his expected payoff is simply the future stream of revenue from human capital investment and "rental":
For any subsequent opportunity, the payoff is the future stream of payments, net of any possibility loss due to human capital "tarnishing" from previous crimes,
where the probability of punishment is P = (1 − (1 − p) σs ), with σ s being the number of acts of theft he has committed to that point. The damage to his human capital in case of punishment is τ and {x it } T 2 is the sequence of human capital investment choices that maximizes his payoff contingent on any future shocks to human capital levels.
If he does take the opportunity r is , his expected payoff is
• p is the probability of being caught and punished by the criminal justice system. For simplicity, I do not try to separate out the impact of being arrested vs being charged, being charged vs being convicted, being convicted vs being sentenced, etc.
• D < 0 is the disutility from any detection, capture or punishment (including any social stigma from an arrest record, a conviction record, etc).
• γ(1 − x i1 )K i1 < 0 is the opportunity cost of the crime, with | γ | the amount of time the crime takes.
• (τ ) (τ for "tarnishing") marks the shift in his human capital K it and his human capital investment strategy x it if he is caught and develops a criminal justice record that limits employers willingness to hire and pay him. Thus, τ ∈ (0, 1) and
• δ is a period of time, less than a year, between the commission of the crime, and the beginning of punishment, so δ ∈ (0, 1).
A few other modeling decisions are worth brief comments:
Theft opportunities are modeled as random processes, where the distribution is the same across all individuals. The logic behind this is developed in another paper, but a brief explanation is that per-act earnings from theft in the NLSY 1997 follow a roughly lognormal distribution.
Average earnings per theft are low, and negatively correlated with number of acts (i.e., people who steal frequently tend to make less than people who steal rarely). There does not seem to be any stability in per-act earnings from year to year, and correlations in earnings from theft are low between siblings. These patterns are extremely consistent with the bulk of research into earnings from crime, whether data is from criminal self-reports, police reports or victimization surveys 3 . While it is difficult to prove a negative, it does not appear to be any meaningful variation of "theft ability" in populations the size the NLSY panel.
One could potentially develop a process by which expected risk of punishment is updated over time, or by which an initial tarnishing (from a criminal record) can be worsened by a second offense. However, theft behavior is generally very short-lived for the vast majority of thieves, and so a more complicated dynamic model is unlikely to yield significantly different results. This may be an interesting future extension of the work in this paper.
II.3 Sequenceof Actions
Actions in the first period 0 can thus be divided into two stages. In the first stage, the agent computes the policy function for optimal investment, sets x i0 accordingly and invests. In the second stage, the agent is exposed to a sequence of S opportunities, and takes any which offer a return greater than the expected cost.
All other periods, t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, the agent simply sets his human capital investment level for the period, x it .
II.4 SolvingtheM odel
The human capital optimization problem is a dynamic optimization problem, and the policy function for the optimal x it (see appendix for derivation) is
As would be expected, optimal human capital investment for agent i in periodt is increasing in time preference β and productivity of investment (d 0 , d 1 ) and decreasing in T −t. Perhaps a bit surprising, it is decreasing in K it . The intuition for this is actually straightforward: in this case human capital is specifically marketable skills, as opposed to general potential. It is a measure of the money agent i can make right now, and so higher values of K it are direct measures of opportunity cost of investment. The production parameters d 0 , d 1 measure the sensitivity of future growth in marketable skills to the level of investment, and are thus more closely tied to the related idea of general potential.
It is advantageous to put r is on one side, as the direct benefit of stealing, and put all the other terms on the other side, simplifying a bit, to measure the cost of stealing. We then get an indicator function c that becomes the optimal policy in response to opportunity r ist at point s
As constructed, the optimal choice in response to every criminal opportunity r ist is to "play" c; that is, to steal if and only if the return is greater than the future cost.
The optimal strategy facing any criminal opportunity r is , thus becomes
Similar to the opportunity-specific indicator function c(r ist ), we can define an indicator functionē(max r ist ) for the entire sequence of opportunities, such that
The probability of becoming a theft is decreasing in all variables that drive the right hand side costs.
We can therefore focus on understanding how differences in K, β and d 0 , d 1 lead to differences in the following three costs:
Lost earnings from developing a criminal record, the difference between earnings from "pure"
and "tarnished" human capital,
expected future disutility from criminal justice punishment,
and immediate opportunity cost,
II.5 W ageDevelopmentU nderDif f erentP arameterizationsof theM odel
If we focus on the three key parameters that are important in both the human capital component of the model as well as the theft component -initial capitalK i , discount rate β and human capital production parameters d 0 and d 1 -we can see that variation in these parameters will induce predictable changes in measurable variables such as wages, hours worked and years of education. In this subsection we focus on three questions: How does variation in these parameters lead to variation in wage development? Does variation in these parameters lead to lower wage A second important note is how variation in different parameters leads to different patterns.
For instance, low initial human capital (K i ) acts to reduce the overall development of human capital K t and wages (1 − x t )K t . We see roughly parallel development in wages in the baseline and the lowK i cases (Figure 1 ). The intuition here is simple: in the case of lowK i , investment levels are higher, and there is some catchup effect, but it is not worth the loss of present wages to fully catchup to the baseline.
In contrast, low discount rates (figure 2) and low human capital production parameters (figure 3) both create a "crossing" pattern, where wages start high relative to the baseline but then develop more slowly and drop below the baseline wages. In the case of low discount rate β or low human capital production parameters d 0 and d 1 , the utility payoff of human capital investment is lower than in the baseline, and so human capital investment is lower over all periods. This has the effect of increasing wages in the early periods but reducing them in later periods.
It is thus clear that lower initial human capital could potentially explain lower instantaneous opportunity cost, but lower patience and lower human capital potential could not.
An additional note is that relative minor changes in discount factor β and human capital production parameters d 0 and d 1 lead to very significant changes in wage development. Table 1 .
The results are striking. Both the low β andK i parameterizations do lead to greater incentives to steal; discounting all fifty years and summing we get a total difference in lost wages ranging between $3,000 to $7,000. Interestingly, lower human capital production capacity ( In addition to a wide range of questions about work, earnings, education, assets, beliefs, health, family and other issues, every round of the NLSY 1997 includes a self-administered questionaire that asks respondents about potentially compromising issues such as criminal behavior.
One thousand two hundred and two respondents, or roughly 12.5% of the respondents, admit to stealing items worth more than $50 at any point 4 Thieves are defined as individuals who report stealing at least one item worth more than $50 by 2003.
[ In Figure 4 I show the development of hourly wages for thieves and non-thieves to 2011. The means are very similar to roughly age 30, after which thieves begin to fall below non-thieves.
There is no evidence that this similarity is due to attrition, non-reporting, incarceration or selection bias in the NLSY; attrition rates are about the same for both thieves and non-thieves, and incarceration is minimal.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
IV. GMM ANALYSIS
IV.1 Overviewof M ethodology
Having used the initial analysis of the model to focus on heterogeneity of (a) time preference . This can be concieved as simplifying a 50-year career into ten five-year periods, beginning age 17 and ending age 67.
Based on the ten period model, we are able to observe some or all of three periods for most NLSY respondents. The core GMM model is thus three equations,
(1−β 9 )
(1−β)
(1−β 8 )
where W 1 , W 2 , W 3 are a measure of wages or earnings for ages 17-21, 22-26 and 27-31, respectively. In the analysis that follows I use hourly compensation and annual income, getting very similar results for both.
In this form there are four unknowns: K 0 , d 0 , d 1 , β, one more than the number of equations.
As discussed in Appendix B, I have experimented with running the regressions with various parameters set, focusing on approaches where β is set. The results tend to be stable within a range of values that is consistent with the literature.
Having found a set of values that are both consistent with the data and the literature, it now becomes possible to estimate the difference in K 0 and β between non-thieves (honest individuals) and thieves. I now run identical equations for thieves and non-thieves, which creates six equations (three each for both categories). Because d 0 , d 1 and β have similar effects on wage development, it was not possible to get GMM to converge even in cases of six equations and six unknowns (the model is very nonlinear in d 0 , d 1 and β). By using a range of reasonable values for d 1 and then d 0 , d 1 I was able to get precise estimates of K 0h , K 0t , β h , β t . For a fuller discussion of the process and additional regression output, see Appendix B.
As can be seen in Table 3 , the regressions estimate the difference in initial human capital for thieves as about $0.60-0.67/hour, and the difference in discount rate at 0.3%. I rerun all these regressions using annual income data. The results from these are very similar to the hourly wage regressions, and can be seen in Table 4 . The difference in initial human capital is estimated at $2,200 to $2,450, with a difference in discount rate of 0.4%.
[ In addition the GMM results detailed above, I have also run a range of multiple regressions comparing (a) number of grades repeated and (b) number of employers for thieves and nonthieves. Across a range of specifications, using a variety of controls, and limiting the population to individiuals with no criminal justice penalties, theft is positively and significantly associated with both repeating grades and number of employers. Thus, we can see a strong pattern of underinvestment in schooling and at the same time evidence of a great deal of engagement in the labor market.
IV.2 Analysis : HeterogeneityLeadingtoT hef t
In Equation 1, theft is predicted if the return is greater than the sum of (a) the expected lost future earnings (from the tarnishing of human capital if caught) (b) the expected disutility from punishment and (c) the opportunity cost of lost time.
The preceding analysis points strongly towards certain meaningful differences between thieves and non-thieves. In particular, differences in lost future earnings and expected disutility from punishment can help to explain differences in behavior, while there is little sign of differences in the opportunity cost of lost time.
As shown in Table 1 , if being caught and sentenced for theft is likely to reduce future earnings by 10%, then the individuals who have reported theft would on average expect to lose about $6,500 in net present value from such a sentence. If the risk of punishment was evaluated at 10%, then the cutoff of an "attractive" theft opportunity would be about $650 lower for thieves than non-thieves. If the risk of punishment was evaluated at 1%, then it would be about $65 lower for thieves. Since the reported thefts are for items valued at $50 or more, this suggests that thieves decisions make some sense on a rational basis.
Additionally, the subjective difference in discount rate also leads to a difference in the discounted disutility of punishment, although not as great -since the difference on a monthly basis is about one-one-hundredth of a percent, disutility from punishment would have to be on the order of $100,000 or more for it to make so much as $1.00 difference.
One plausible source of heterogeneity is not supported in this analysis or in the NLSY 1997 data: differences in opportunity cost, which would make theft reasonable as a substitute for labor, do not show up. The hourly wages and annual incomes are effectively the same for both groups.
V. CONCLUSION
I have developed and solved a model that links human capital investment and theft behavior.
I focus on the three sets of human capital parameters as potential sources of variation in theft behavior: initial human capitalK i , patience β i , and human capital production potential d 0 , d 1 .
At first blush, all are plausible candidates for particularly low perceived costs to theft. Very low initial human capital, within the model, could significantly reduce the opportunity cost of theft and the perceived future lost wages from developing a criminal record. Similarly, very low discount rates (high impatience) could reduce the present discounted value of future punishment and future lost wages. Low human capital production potential would mean lower earnings further on in the individual's career, and might reduce the expected cost of theft.
The last of these is the most easily disposed of: low human capital production potential (low
, while a reasonable match to the differential wage development of thieves and non-thieves, does not actually lead to any difference in the present value of lost future wages. Low potential does not appear to lower any of the other costs of theft -it does not affect disutility of criminal justice sanctions or the immediate opportunity cost of crime. These parameters can thus be rejected as a potential explanation within the rational agent framework.
Low initial human capital appears to play a role, but only with regard to net present value of future earnings. One obvious explanation of theft, lower opportunity cost, cannot be supported by the data. Hourly and annual earnings for thieves are about the same if not higher than for non-thieves, a pattern that can be seen in other data as well.
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Lower discount rate also appear to play a role. Estimated discount rates for thieves are slightly lower than for non-thieves; combined with the lower initial human capital, this leads to significant differences in the discounted value of lost future earnings. More generally, lower discount rates may be linked to lack of self-control and a lower fear of punishment.
Combined, the decision to steal appears to have some rational basis: individuals reporting having committed a theft of items worth more than $50 would reasonably expect, on average, to face about $6,500 less in discounted lost earnings. If the risk of punishment was estimated at somewhere around 1-5%, the difference in future costs would be $65-325, enough to plausibly make sufficient difference for a rational agent.
Interestingly, data on the wage and employment during the age where theft is maximized show little difference; it is only be looking at earnings in the late 20s and early 30s that we can see the difference. The opportunity cost of time during the period of theft cannot help explain the decision in the NLSY 1997 data, making it difficult to sustain arguments that view property crime as a substitute for legitimate labor (other crimes, particularly drug dealing, are important in different ways, and labor substitution may play a significant role with them). Wage development in the human capital model outlined in the text. The baseline parameterization with an annual discount factor of 0.961 is compared with the low β parameterization (where β is 0.959). As can be seen, wages are extremely similar, but start slightly higher in the low β version, dropping relative to the baseline. This is because human capital investment yields a lower discounted value for a low β individual. non-thieves. Notice that (a) wages are extremely similar across all years, making any opportunity cost very difficult to substantiate, and (b) wages are slightly higher for thieves in the teen years but then become lower in the late twenties, very much in keeping with differences in discount rates. Comparison is among males in the simple random sample who are not incarcerated to 2003. Representative parameterizations of the model, showing how a 10% loss of income from a conviction differentially impacts those with lower initial human capital, discount rates, or human capital potential.
Notice that while low initial human capital and a low discount rate lead to a lower anticipated present value from a conviction, lower "potential" (lower human capital development parameters) does not substantially vary lost future income. The combination of low initial human capital and low discount rate leads to a very substantial reduction in lost future income and is a close match to the wage progression in the data. Note that d0, d1, β are five-year values (the model works in 10 periods, representing a 50-year career length). More detail on these computations is provided in Table 9 in Appendix C. More background on the source of parameters is given in Appendix B. data between thieves and non-thieves. While no age or ethnicity differences emerge in the data, there are significant differences on measure directly related to human capital.
Particularly, thieves are more likely come from a family of origin with lower income and have lower test scores and evaluated mental health. (Bertsekas, 2005) .
The problem is (as above) formally:
The objective function is concave in x it , so we can work backwards from period T , solving for the optimal solution and looking for the general pattern.
Period T: Since in period T , the agent has no concern with any later periods, investment should be set to 0.
Period T-1: In period T − 1, the agent is maximizing the discounted present value of his human capital in both T − 1 and T :
Taking the derivative with regard to x iT −1 and solving for it−1 we get:
Continuing in this manner we see the pattern:
B. BACKGROUND ON PARAMETERS AND GMM PROCESS
For the parameter values throughout the paper, I began with parameter values from the literature, in particular Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998, Using these as starting values we can then estimate the difference in β and K 0 for thieves and non-thieves. For hourly earnings the first values can be seen in Table 7 ; to get these values I set only d 1 , and specify different values of β an K 0 for thieves and non-thieves. In order to compute the different K 0 and β values, that is K 0h , β h for non-thieves (honest) and K 0t , β t for thieves, I run two sets of the main three equations at the same time. 
(1−β 9 t ) (1−β t )
To get more precise standard errors for β h , β t , K 0h and K 0t I use the computed value of d 0 and rerun GMM with both d 0 and d 1 set. This gives the same point estimates, but much more precise standard errors, as can be seen in Table 3 .
Together, these regressions estimate the difference in initial human capital for thieves as about $0.60-0.67/hour, and the difference in discount rate at 0.3%. In 7 the difference in discount rates is not significant, but due to the tighter standard errors it is significant in Table 3. I rerun all these regressions using annual income data. The results from these are very similar to the hourly wage regressions, and can be seen in Table 8 and 4. The difference in initial human capital is estimated at $2,200 to $2,450, with a difference in discount rate of 0.4%. Table 9 shows computations of the future lost income, discounted to period 0, from a 10% drop in K (due to a conviction or criminal record before period 1 begins) is computed. Note that in the lowK i and low β parameterization the lost value of lifetime income in case of a criminal record before period 0 are very similar, and about 90% of that under the baseline. Interestingly, even though an individual with low human capital production prospects (low coefficients d 0 , d 1 ) will earn lower wages in later life, the NPV of those wages (and any lost income) is virtually identical to the baseline. In other words, with regard to lost future income, lowerK i and β are more consistent with a "thief" parameterization, where the costs of theft are lower than the norm. 
